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Affordable and sustainable space exploration remains an elusive goal. We explore the 
competitive advantages of evolving towards independent operators for space transportation 
in our economy. We consider the pros and cons of evolving business organizations that 
operate and maintain space transportation system assets independently from flight system 
manufacturers and from host spaceports. The case is made that a more competitive business 
climate for creating inherently operable, dependable, and supportable space transportation 
systems can evolve out of today’s traditional vertical business model—a model within which 
the voice of the operator is often heard, but rarely acted upon during crucial design 
commitments and critical design processes. Thus new business models may be required, 
driven less by hardware consumption and more by space system utilization. 
 
I. Introduction 
PERABLE, supportable, and dependable space systems have long existed on space program drawing 
boards, and as important objectives in industry business plans. Taking the leap from thought to reality, 
however, has proven very difficult. Each new attempt, whether publicly or privately funded, seemingly 
ends with disappointment. The system availability is far poorer than promised; spacecraft, even when successfully 
deployed and positioned, are often not as dependable as the business plans and program budgets had promised. 
Worse, the total support costs grow much higher than anticipated, with the result that the enterprises are difficult to 
sustain from an investment standpoint, whether private or public. 
O 
 It is thus instructive to explore the operational characteristics typically designed into space systems. Just as 
important to address, however, are the competitive incentives and business advantages—if any—that might reward 
space system design trades that favor greater operability, supportability, and dependability. We will examine the 
nature of today’s vertical space transportation industry and explore the possibilities of evolving a new competitive 
market segment—the independent space operator. Born out of today’s operations and support experience and 
capabilities, this industry stakeholder (i.e., the user-operator) could exercise a strong voice during the design process 
and change the present outcome. 
 Independent operators (whether commercially or contractually independent) can have a voice in the design 
selection process with power over an array of competing suppliers, ultimately evolving toward real commercial 
purchasing power that discriminates, much as space business insurance providers are now discriminating,1 between 
systems with a track record of meeting expectations and those without.  
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II. Background—the Players 
 When analyzing a generic space transportation industry, general classifications of the major business players can 
be identified.  In a later section we will examine the business incentives and design motivations of each of these in 
more detail. Whether the market is military, civilian, or commercial, the major players that have a direct role or a 
direct stake in the design process are: 
1) Manufacturers/Suppliers—focused on designing and producing the hardware product. 
2) Operators—focused on making the design work, and more importantly, on developing a payload delivery 
service for the space transportation customer. 
3) Spaceport Hosts—focused on providing the harboring facilities, systems, and equipment for one or more 
operators and their customers. This may be a large-scale orbital/planetary complex (e.g., Cape Canaveral or 
Vandenberg Air Force Base), a smaller hosts which could be an existing airports authorized for space flight 
operations (e.g., Mojave Airport, California)   
4) Transportation Customers—requiring personnel or cargo delivery. Current examples are government 
agencies and commercial telecommunications providers. 
III. Is There Really a Difference Between alt.space and big.space?  
Often called into question in terms of an organization’s ability to create a more effective space system is the 
business paradigm within which it is created. In today’s space transportation market an alternative set of players, 
often referred to as alt.space in the political arena,2 has emerged to compete with larger, more traditional aerospace 
conglomerates, or big.space. Is there, however, really a difference between the two when it comes to the ability to 
understand the needs of the operator?  
A. Vertically Integrated Business Structures 
Whether large or small, space transportation providers are almost all highly vertical in corporate structure. With 
very few exceptions they not only design and produce the flight systems, they also operate them on the ground (or 
form subsidiaries to so do). The space industry does not put the flight hardware on the open market for any qualified 
company, such as an independent spaceline; instead, today’s companies and business alliances usually design, 
specify and/or construct customized launch platforms, dedicated control rooms, unique assembly facilities, and 
dedicated propellant supply and distribution services. Still later in the development process, they design and 
fabricate ground support equipment. This is often accomplished with cost-plus contract commitments made with a 
customer well in advance of a good understanding and agreement on the quantity and complexity of flight-to-ground 
interfaces. Ultimately, the prime contractor (or their corporate subsidiary or affiliate) then operates and maintains 
their custom ground infrastructure designs on contract to the customer.  
B. A New Engineering and Applied Technology Paradigm Required 
The question is whether this vertical structure is truly addressing the equipment improvement needs of the user-
operator segment of the industry—for both alt.space and big.space alike. The reflective case, however, also needs to 
be addressed, i.e., whether operations and infrastructure business managers are applying adequate engineering 
resources and attention to identifying and conveying needed technical improvements to the design community—
both flight and ground systems. Technology push approaches by technology managers have repeatedly been 
thwarted not only by a lack of analysis by the operator community (i.e., the technology pull), but also by designers 
not being provided adequate engineering evidence of maturity for non-traditional design options. 
Engineering excellence—that questioning and probing attitude of the skilled engineer—is what will be required 
to influence the design characteristics of both flight and ground systems. Applied technologists are needed not only 
to develop the operational components and systems, but also to build the technical foundation required to thoroughly 
test and improve new designs and provide solid evidence that inspires engineering confidence in the innovations. In 
this way elegant solutions that improve all the attributes of the system throughout the life cycle become more visible 
and acceptable, and move from the realm of the impractical to the realm of the entirely possible. 
C. Need for Life Cycle Balance 
In other words, if the desire is to improve the attributes of the total life cycle, then we must ask whether the 
vertical business arrangement is the right one for today’s situation? Can today’s space industrial models (large or 
small) bring about a healthy balance between the longer-term needs of the operator during the nearer-term design 
process? To answer these questions, we must examine each stakeholder’s overall motivations. 
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IV. Business Incentives of the Major Stakeholders 
A. Manufacturer’s Motivations and Business Incentives 
 The spacecraft or launch vehicle manufacturer’s motivation is ultimately focused on production sales of flight 
hardware and associated software products. Sales and profits, from the manufacturer’s point of view, are maximized 
by tying the sale of a flight directly to the sale of flight hardware—preferably expended after each flight.3 
Manufacturing profits are further compounded when multiple flight elements are assembled at the launch site for 
each flight (such as multiple rocket engines, strap-on boosters, or multiple common elements) and thus consume 
even more hardware per customer order. This then creates, from a near-term perspective only, even greater hardware 
demand and thus more hardware sales within a given market condition. 
1. The GSE–Creep Phenomenon 
Past experience documents that ground support equipment (GSE) creep—a process where the required number of 
servicing and support equipment items and vendors trends upwards following the conceptual design phase, but after 
the sale or commitment is made. This is a subtle phenomenon with not-so-subtle--and potentially very profound--life 
cycle cost impacts. It can be suggested that this represents a desirable economic situation for cost-plus profit on 
government contracts—not only for the unplanned equipment acquisition, but also as a positive situation for the 
prime contractor and vendors for sustaining upkeep. It should not be inferred that this is intentional on the part of the 
design engineers—merely that GSE-creep, when it has surfaced in the past, has worked in the economic favor of the 
manufacturer/supplier. 
2. Near-Term Acquisition Issues Unnaturally Dominate Vertical Business Arrangements 
The manufacturer’s, then, may prefer earning profit by holding down nearer-term manufacturing costs regardless 
of longer-term operations and support impacts that will likely occur well after the business commitment. This 
situation prevails due to the dominance of manufacturing interests in space launch business decision making. 
Moreover, there is little incentive for the manufacturer to be held accountable downstream to perceived “lesser 
priority” operational outcomes, such as the total system responsiveness, total accumulated infrastructure and 
logistics support systems. While these customer demands and operator needs are held as high priorities during the 
conceptual design phases and design competitions, these typically become mere design goals and not design-to 
objectives during detailed requirements reviews and into the preliminary design phase. As long as the customer is 
promised a capability to deliver a payload successfully to space, and total costs are estimated to be acceptable to the 
customer, those characteristics that influence downstream annual operation and infrastructure costs are allowed to be 
treated with optimism in vertically-integrated business arrangements—which results in critical compromises that are 
perceived to favor up-front acquisition issues. 
3. Dispelling a Popular Myth: What’s Good for Operations is Bad for Development 
In reality, the simpler and less hazardous design characteristics that favor the operator, also tend to favor up-front 
development efforts because there is less design work to do: there are fewer parts; fewer subsystems and systems to 
analyze and specify; the tooling and fabrication work is less intense; not to mention the simpler and less hazardous 
testing and qualification processes. This is not news: it was observed by early rocket program managers. The 
German Army V-2 tactical missile development inspired one overseeing officer to write: 
The whole design has apparently been done as if hundreds of people had the time to spend weeks going over the rocket 
on the stand, installing valves, doing assembly work, moving cables, and generally fumbling around. Cooperation 
between the Test Group and [the Design Department] is lacking…4
 The way to lower life cycle costs across the board—from design through recurring operations—is to find means 
early in the design process for removing work content. 
B. Operator’s Functions and Business Incentives 
1. Availability and Ownership Costs 
 The space transportation system operator, on the other hand, is concerned with producing profit from sales of 
space flights to a paying customer. This translates to a focus on ownership and operation of the space transportation 
system equipment and software (both flight and ground support). Repeatedly purchasing equipment, and the 
recurring costs to operate and support that equipment, should be minimized. The number of paid flights by a 
customer base is to be maximized, i.e., the system availability must reach a high enough threshold to overcome 
recurring support burden. Labor-intensive mission planning and flight support, as well as equipment-intensive 
assembly and servicing of spacecraft and launch vehicles are thus to be minimized. The labor and equipment 
intensity required to accomplish this falls directly out of the flight and ground system design characteristics. If, for 
example, the design process leaves the total number and complexity of systems and subsystems to chance, then the 
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flight-to-ground interfaces are likely to accumulate quickly during preliminary design, with the end result being a 
disappointingly large required workforce—with a still larger workforce then required to safely sustain it all.  
2. Demand for Dependability 
On the other hand, operators too often appear to be too quick to accept the design status quo within today’s 
situation, rather than pushing for improvements. A case in point is today’s design approach to flight reliability. The 
user-operator often has a difficult time finding equipment that strikes a design balance between added layers of 
hardware redundancy to gain desired flight reliability on the one hand, or accepting inadequately designed critical 
single point failures. Added hardware (in some cases, itself hazardous) then becomes a severe but often difficult to 
quantify maintenance burden–ultimately adding potentially huge cumulative costs to the transportation customer. 
Yet operating risky space vehicles with too many single point failures is also highly undesirable. 
Thus what operators should be demanding is more stringent design life requirements, improvements in overall 
engineering quality relative to the space environments encountered, more comprehensive and thorough testing of the 
designs, and programs similar in objective to the zero-defect program of Apollo.5 Today’s designers and operators 
are beginning to feel pressure to make such changes through the space insurance industry’s incipient  rating of 
individual vehicle’s based on their space mission reliability record—which is still very low from the insurance 
industry’s point of view.  
An independent operator business segment would begin culling out designs with an overabundance of 
troublesome hardware. They would begin building an equipment supply chain that is focused on simple system and 
subsystem designs with fewer parts, but with ones that have a good service record for flight and ground operations. 
C. Spaceport Host 
1. Enabling It All To Come Together 
We need to look at another player in the space systems design process that is too often mistaken for the 
operator—the spaceport host.  This player’s function is to enable the manufacturer, the operators, and the customer 
to accomplish their functions safely (first and foremost) and effectively.  
2. Design Roles and Responsibilities 
The host’s job is a difficult balance of roles and responsibilities sometimes at odds with one another during the 
design phase; i.e., they must balance their responsibilities for designing facilities, equipment and various support 
services, while at the same time recognizing that they will inherit the end result (the routine operations and 
infrastructure) of this work.  
The industries supporting these functions are, like the flight system producer, looking to sell assets, only in this 
case it is new facilities, new structures, new ground equipment, and new command and control systems. Tending to 
be government-owned entities, the spaceport hosts’ most direct industry partners during the design phase are one or 
more architectural and engineering firms that perform facility design and construction, ground equipment design and 
fabrication, and ground software development. 
The design challenges here depend a great deal on the scale and complexity of the spacecraft and launch vehicles 
themselves. It often involves scores of separate and often exotic propellants, fluids, and gases, and literally hundreds 
if not thousands of flight-to-ground interfaces for a complex human-rated system. Complex, multi-element space 
vehicles can require a ground architecture encompassing numerous geographically-concentrated flight hardware 
processing stations. For the Space Shuttle the many processing stations require over 5,000 GSE items accumulated 
from various flight and ground element suppliers.6 It also encompasses an equal number of complex, functionally-
distributed sets of systems that: control information flow; provide fire, medical, rescue, and security services during 
routine hazardous processing operations—if required by the vehicle design—and not just during the launch and 
landing events; along with many other important functions including weather services, pyrotechnic and ordnance 
device storage, communications and tracking, and range safety support. 
D. Summary of Stakeholder Incentives 
In short, the business motives of the space flight system manufacturers and suppliers are very different than the 
prime motives of system operators, which in turn are very different from the spaceport hosts—all within the same 
industry.  How can these differences be reconciled, while increasing competitiveness and value for the transportation 
customer? In order to answer this question, we look at how other industries with vertical economic structures, 
having reached a plateau from its initial growth spurt, transformed into a different economic structure that spurred 
new market growth. 
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V. Historical Examples and Current Trends 
A. Air Mail Act of 1934 
1. Background 
United States commercial air transportation services in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s transformed from a vertically 
integrated structure dominated by U.S. Postal Service Air 
Mail to a more horizontally distributed system that legally 
separated the operator from the aircraft manufacturer by 
World II. Air transportation holding companies were formed 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s on a vertical business model 
that was shaped around U. S. Air Mail contracts passed out to 
industry by the U. S. Postmaster General. An example was the 
United Aircraft and Transport Company, a conglomerate of 
Boeing Air Transport and other airmail airlines, such as 
National Air Transport, Pratt & Whitney, Sikorsky, among 
other companies.7 Another example is Eastern Airlines, 
owned by North American Aviation.8 The most important 
factor to note is that these holding companies owned the 
means of aircraft production, the airlines that operated its 
aircraft, and even (surprisingly, given local government 
investment in them) some private airports and airfields to 
complete their respective  ground networks. 
 
 
2. Vertical Transportation Market and “Spoils” 
Contention grew when the nascent passenger air travel ma
could not get the manufacturers motivated to the type of air
features) to convince the public that it was safe to fly. This e
consolidated airline routes to only three selected companies at w
in May of 1930. Their smaller competitors were forced out. 
election of 1932. With a change of administrations, and in the m
referred to the process of giving contracts as spoils, and further,
the previous administration. After a short period of time the 
contracts were let forbidding simultaneous ownership of bo
companies. After the Air Mail Act of 1934, United Airlines fo
company.9
3. Separating the Means of Production from the Means of Opera
As a result of the Air Mail Act of 1934, the new United Airl
from whomever it wished—not just the aircraft products of a s
airlines, were now independent operators. More significantly, t
whatever markets made sense to their business model and w
manufacturer owners. These now independent companies then d
features, so that air transport technologists in general (and th
NACA, in particular) emerged as important national economic as
B. Satellite Industry Trends 
 Also of note is the telecommunications satellite operations m
a separation of the means of production from the means of ope
European satellite navigational information system, Galileo. The
hardware procurements being intentionally separated from grou
this may be a trend to watch for with respect to spaceport, missio
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Airmail aircraft were not suited for the expanding
passenger market, yet were the most lucrative for the
vertical air mail market of the early 1930s rket was largely stifled because smaller operators 
craft they needed (particularly in terms of safety 
rupted into scandal when the Postmaster General 
hat later became known as the “Spoils Conference” 
This became a presidential campaign issue in the 
idst of the Great Depression, a Senate investigation 
 that the contracts had been issued to the friends of 
existing airmail contracts were canceled and new 
th airlines companies and aircraft manufacturing 
r example, was separated from its parent holding 
tion  
ines was free to purchase, own, and operate aircraft 
ole owner. United Airlines, and indeed by law all 
hese independent operators were free to move into 
ere not confined by the needs of their aircraft 
rove technology needs for safer aircraft designs and 
e National Advisory Council for Aeronautics, or 
sets in the late 1930s and beyond.   
arket, where corporate and business distinctions and 
rations can be observed.10 Another example is the 
re thus appears to be a emerging trend toward flight 
nd system procurements. For space transportation, 
n, and launch operations.                          
s and Astronautics 
C. Telecommunications Development 
Figure 2. The Bell System Monopoly 
In 1984, as a regulated monopoly, the Bell System 
had been largely insulated from market pressures 
for most of its history. 
Additional examples outside the aerospace industry offer 
additional historical insight. The technology revolution in the 
telecommunications industry that occurred in the latter decades 
of the twentieth century can arguably in part be traced to the 
end of the vertical industry structure that existed in that 
industry prior to legal actions.11,12      
A brief history of the Bell System and AT&T describes the 
situation in moving from a vertical monopoly to a competitive 
market: 
As a regulated monopoly, the Bell System had been largely insulated from market pressures for most of its history. Its 
culture venerated service, technological excellence, reliability, and innovation within a non-competitive internally-driven 
framework of taking however much time and money it took to get things done right. The new AT&T had to learn how to 
find out and deliver what its customers wanted, when its customers wanted it, in competition with others who sought to 
fill the same customers' needs. 13
VI. Need for Variation from Past Attempts 
The concept of independent space operators with hardware selection and/or purchasing power over 
manufacturers should be distinguished from past attempts to “privatize” the Space Shuttle operations. The United 
Space Alliance (USA) under NASA’s Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC), and its predecessor, the Lockheed 
Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC), were attempts to establish separate operators. In both cases, the “operations 
contractor” was not involved (or even in existence) during design requirements development, nor during the design 
phase. The SPC contract, which came into being shortly after the Orbital Flight Test Program in the early-mid 
1980s, was not in existence during the acquisition phase of Shuttle. As with today’s USA contract, Lockheed/SPC 
had no significant independent purchasing power to search, select, or to acquire its own equipment assets.   
VII. Programmatic Potential for Enabling Needed Technical/Technology Improvements 
A. Overall Needs and the Independent Space Operator Strategy 
If the operator and the spaceport host are empowered during the design phase to influence the outcome relative 
to lower ownership costs and higher levels of dependability for their flight and ground equipment, then increased 
flight availability seems likely to result. Further, if the operator were provided the ability to choose the flight 
equipment and choose the spaceport host, then they would have the opportunity to turn the resulting increased flight 
availability into market growth, which in turn means real purchasing power to grow the whole industry—
manufacturers, operators, and spaceports alike. This might be accomplished through a series of evolutionary steps 
that serve to begin separating the industry’s means of production from the means of operation while still within the 
design process. 
B. Potential Acquisition Strategies (In Order of Degree of Operator Independence) 
Bringing a more influential operator’s voice into the design process requires that economically viable operator’s 
exist. Shown below are a series of cases that demonstrate an increasing degree of operator independence, equipment 
selection, and purchasing power: 
 Status Quo Acquisition 
 The current practice is to rely on in-house operations engineering support during requirements development 
for the operations functions and the facility, systems, and equipment design functions. This is followed by a 
period of reliance on the selected vehicle prime contractor to provide launch and recovery site operations 
engineering.  
 Simultaneous Life Cycle Acquisition 
 In this strategy there is continued reliance on in-house operations engineering support during requirements 
development for the operations functions and the facility, systems and equipment design functions. 
However, a separate contract for operations is let by the customer during the preliminary design phase and 
continues through first year or so of routine operations. That final year of the contract is the basis for 
performance evaluation, awards and continuation reviews and options negotiation. This independent 
operations contractor is provided significant selection authority, alongside the in-house operations 
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engineers during design reviews, as they will have a significant stake in the design outcome they inherit. 
Independent Commercial Spacelines 
 The most aggressive approach, and the goal for the longer term, is to contract independent commercial 
space operators to carry out the entire process, from operations requirements development, through all 
phases of design, and continuing through routine operations.  
C. Specific Design Objectives 
Motivated by profit-seeking to bring about affordable and productive operations, independent space operators 
would tend to search for inherently operable space flight systems and technologies. For example, recent studies have 
begun identifying key functions and design needs associated with space transportation ground operations and 
infrastructure.14  How independent operators might impact the major high-level functions are addressed below: 
1. Unplanned Troubleshooting & Repair Operations 
Independent operators may be expected to have greater latitude to acquire dependable flight and ground 
hardware solutions. This in turn would initiate a transformation in how space flight systems are certified and 
qualified for space flight, since there would then be an emphasis on removing sources of costly unplanned hardware 
change-outs. Inherently reliable parts and systems, demanded by the operator, would also influence the overall 
operating risks and safety of the system. This should occur naturally as operators continually search for less complex 
systems with lower part counts and focus on demonstrated reliability rather than relying on redundant parts with 
lesser reliability. This contrasts with today where vehicle system and subsystem designs give rise to high part counts 
in opposition to the operator’s needs.  
Another current design problem involves inadvertently specifying that the operator should routinely replace 
numerous limited-life items, thus destroying the functional integrity of the system between flights, and in turn 
creating unplanned troubleshooting and repair, and additional system servicing. 
With today’s demonstrated reliability and dependability, engineering confidence in a vehicle type certification is 
inconceivable. Instead, each flight, due to numerous part change-outs and intrusive repair activities (many hundreds 
on the Shuttle Orbiter and hundreds on domestic expendables per flight), must go through a rigorous pre-flight 
engineering review. These flight readiness reviews (FRRs) involve nationwide engineering examinations of the 
entire supply chain for material and process (M&P) variations and of assembly, servicing and checkout activities, 
often requiring battalions of “sustaining engineers” at the design organizations; legions of configuration managers; 
and regiments of safety and mission assurance experts—among others.   
Independent operators would have no vested interest in hardware/part re-supply and manufacture. They would 
instead be motivated to invest in highly dependable parts and inherently reliable technologies. Over time, the 
operators would thus move the industry toward flights that involved no part removals or additions at the launch site. 
Once this is repeatedly demonstrated, vehicle-type certification could become a reality. 
2. Launch Vehicle Assembly and Integration Operations 
Assembly of flight elements upon arrival at the launch area is a major work contributor. This includes more than 
just the lift and mate operations of major flight elements, such as mating the Orbiter onto its booster/tank assembly; 
or the mating of a strap-on solid to a core expendable vehicle element. Flight element assembly operations have 
consistently required installation of ordnance devices and routing of electrical cables in systems tunnels that go 
across elements. Other assembly operations include application of thermal protection (spray-on, curtain installation, 
etc.), and installation of range safety equipment among many other time-consuming and labor-intensive activities.  
Much attention has been focused on automatic mechanisms for the mating of the elements, which may well be 
needed for designs with many flight elements to integrate into a launch vehicle. Mating operations and functional 
verification of the mate should be designed to be routinely performed in a matter of minutes. Today, however, such 
operations (including functional verification for cryogenic propellant flow, leak-free flow of other fluids, and 
electrical integrity) take hours and work shifts, if not days, depending on the complexity of the vehicle design.  
Thus more attention needs to be focused on designs that reduce the number of flight elements per launch. This 
will tend to be desired by independent operators in order to reduce costs, in turn bringing about a “no assembly 
required” policy at the spaceport. Operators also need designs for reliable, dependable separation systems that 
eliminate the use of ordnance devices. Again, this would aid the independent operator by eliminating the need for 
time-consuming, profit reducing, and hazardous facility and area clears involved with the installation and checks of 
such hazardous designs. 
There likewise is a need for additional emphasis in researching alternative means of thermal protection, as 
compared to the complex, process-variant and time-consuming spray-on foam application techniques, as is practiced 
today. 
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3. Servicing Operations 
One of the great needs of an independent operator (as opposed to a government or dependent operator) is the 
reduction in ground servicing operations. These include simplified propellant loading operations with far fewer, less 
labor-intensive thermal conditioning tasks; far fewer dedicated power management fluid energy loading tasks, such 
as filling, draining, system pressurizations and purges. The Space Shuttle Orbiter, for example, has 402 interfaces 
with the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF), most of which relate to fluid and gas system servicing. While 
contemporary expendable vehicles are generally less interface-intensive than the decades-old Orbiter, the number of 
hoses, ducts, and service arms for expendables, still allow considerable room for improvement. Independent 
operators--given the opportunity--would tend to seek elimination of the overabundance of interfaces, dedicated 
umbilicals, and swing arms.  
Significant reductions in servicing operations costs require wholesale elimination of dedicated subsystems, with 
consolidation of functions. The objective is to eliminate dedicated working fluids and systems of parts when a more 
robust and flexible set of parts in a similar system could perform the same function. Some of the solutions may be 
the result of simpler, smarter design practices, while others may prove to be technologically challenging. For 
example, the general layout of a vertically-launched propulsive vehicle often elevates the liquid oxygen tank. When 
this is done, dedicated anti-geyser flight and ground hardware, with resulting added operations, inhibit the operator’s 
ability to conduct simple propellant loading and conditioning operations. Careful, up-front conceptual design might 
eliminate entire subsystems on the vehicle, and on the ground, if operability were the highest priority.  
Other potential solutions require more technology development and demonstration. For example, the elimination 
of hydraulic and pneumatic equipment in favor of more-electric solutions offers tremendous potential to simplify the 
overall power management architecture of space transportation systems (Figure 4). 
4. Functional Verification Operations 
Checkout and inspection operations, two of the more highly visible functions of the ground crew, are directly 
dependent not only on the flight criticality of a system or function, but also on the engineering confidence of the 
overall design. 
If the degree of unplanned repair work is high enough (and it only takes a total of one or two items routinely per 
flight to qualify), then the overall system cannot be depended upon to function without conducting detailed system 
checks. 
With today’s high level of parts replacement, engineering practice over the years has instilled a significant 
amount of confidence-building test, checkout, and inspection operations as the vehicle is built-up and serviced for 
flight. If a system typically leaks, then routine, time-consuming, and labor-intensive leak checks are required. If 
high-traffic internal compartment servicing is designed into the vehicle, and nicked wires, dented ducts and other 
collateral damage typically results, then pre-closeout “confidence runs” that power up the systems are often used as 
good practice to prevent major interruptions during the launch countdown.  
The overall strategy of a profit seeking independent operator is potentially different: 1) demonstrate vehicle 
processing without destroying the integrity of the flight vehicle and its systems, and, 2) embed component health 
monitoring with system-level health management technologies for both the flight and ground elements of the 
architecture.  
The focus of an independent operator is likely to be on validation of health management systems that provide 
confidence that the system has maintained functional integrity, thus avoiding having to destroy the structural or 
functional configuration of the vehicle to verify proper operation. On the other hand, premature deployment of novel 
technical solutions can put the operator in a worse position by forcing continued troubleshooting of immature 
instrumentation (i.e., the “red light” comes on often enough to lose confidence in the total system design and 
technology). 
5. Setting up an Applied Technology Pipeline 
The technology focus for the operationally effective systems likely to be required by independent operators is 
going to be most challenging at the mid- to high-levels of technology readiness. While the industry has a wealth of 
capability in deriving new technology components and materials, the technology integration infrastructure has 
deteriorated severely over recent decades. This offline infrastructure is needed to reduce engineering risks through a 
disciplined technology integration process that includes test and evaluation of interactions among components, 
software algorithms and natural environment effects. With that in mind, independent operators might proceed under 
one of the two following assumptions: 
1) Manufacturers have today all the technology on the shelf they need to succeed, and therefore, independent 
operators are free to immediately purchase highly operable, dependable, and supportable vehicles and 
ground equipment.  
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2) The technology integration and application gap is somehow closed for major subsystem and system design 
disciplines, such as structures and mechanisms, propulsion, power management, thermal management, 
communications, safety management and control systems, and so forth. (Likely only with the proper 
forcing function—such as the emergence of independent operators). 
The first state would be appropriate for commercial independent space operators, while the latter state would 
more appropriately correlate with public–private endeavors. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
The achievement of low cost, operationally responsive space launch systems appears to be a natural consequence 
of the presence of commercial independent space launch operators.  While this is not a necessary condition, we 
argue that it is sufficient because the profit seeking motive of such operators will drive them toward investments that 
lower operational costs. 
 
This in turn suggests that while highly operable space launch systems may be developed within the existing 
vertically integrated manufacturing and launch organizations, it is less likely because profit seeking drives such 
organizations toward maximizing both the number and the value of expended hardware items.  Thus complexity in 
design is at least implicitly—and possibly explicitly—favored over simplicity. 
 
Finally, we observe that in the absence of a secular change in the regulatory environment the development of 
independent operators appears to be stifled. A vision for organizing the industry to naturally encourage business case 
closure for all segments of the space launch industry, and the consequent emergence of architectures that lend 
themselves to the needs of the operator offers the promise of overall system affordability and sustainability. 
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